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Abstract 
This paper examines how and why people migrate between two regions with asymmetric size. The 
agglomeration force comes from the scale economies in the provision of local public goods, whereas 
the dispersion force comes from congestion in consumption of public goods. Public goods considered 
resemble club goods (or public goods with congestion) and people are heterogeneous in their migration 
costs. 
We find that the large countries can be destination of migrants for sufficiently high provision of public 
goods, even when the large country taxes too much. The high provision of public good offsets the 
congestion effect. While, the small country can be the destination of migrants for two reasons. Firstly, 
when public good supply is intermediate, people move to avoid congestion in the large country and to 
benefit from low taxation in the small one. Finally, when the provision of public goods is low, people 
move towards the small countries just to avoid congestion. 
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1 Introduction
In this contribution, we study the effects of individuals’ migration decisions
when these individuals have to arbitrate between the public facilities offered
in their home country, and the psychological costs of moving from their home
country to abroad. The problems raised by migration flows constitute a growing
concern for today’s governments. Migrations can create conflicting aspirations
between the incumbent residents of a country and the new migrants: migrants
are often viewed by the residents as populations enjoying national prerogatives
while they are simultaneously perceived as not contributing enough to national
richness, or steeling jobs to the local population. For example, migrants may
create significant externalities on the incumbent residents through capital and
labor markets and as well public finance channels (see Borjas, 1994, 1995, 1999,
Razin and Sadka, 2004, Friedberg and Hunt, 1995, Leiner 1997, among others).
Such feelings reinforce the natural tendency to hypernationalism, amplifying
thereby the credit given to extremist political views. Furthermore, they make
more difficult the cultural assimilation of migrants in their new environment. It
is thus important to better understand the mechanisms underlying migration
movements. In particular, one must examine whether migration flows have au-
tomatic stabilizers preventing the development of such conflicting aspirations
between migrants and residents, and dampening the migration movements gen-
erated by the asymmetric richness among countries. Each region (or country)
provides its residents with several advantages, like its network of roads, its social
protection, its military organization for public defense, its education facilities.
The production of these public goods is financed by levying taxes on the resi-
dents. When evaluating whether they should change their location, citizens in
a given country balance the benefits expected from the public goods provided
in this country with those derived from the existence of public goods in rival
countries. Of course, this evaluation must also take into account the costs re-
sulting from moving from one country to another, as well as the differentials in
taxes to be paid, and in wages to be obtained, in each of them. The cost of
moving abroad is not the same across the population of residents. Some of them
are strongly attached to their relatives living in their residential area, while oth-
ers are considerably more mobile, simply because they have weaker links with
people living around them (for instance, see Beine et al (2009) for the role of
diasporas on migration). National traditions, patriotism, and historical origins
constitute significant values for some individuals, while they let others, -who
feel like citizens of the World-, almost indifferent. Meteorological conditions
can also influence individuals’ moving costs: for some of them, the passage from
a sunny to a humid country is like a cataclysm while, for others, it does not
entail any disagreement at all! It follows that individuals, placed otherwise in
similar situations, appear as heterogeneous in their willingness to move abroad
to find better conditions in their economic environment.
Endowed with its power to levy taxes and provide public goods, the gov-
ernment plays a crucial role in the individual citizens’ decisions about where to
locate. Regions with a rich panoply of public goods generally exert a powerful
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attraction on the natives of countries (or regions) not so well endowed with pub-
lic facilities. Individuals are attracted by richness, not only for private goods
but as well for public facilities. For instance, a large fraction of migrations from
the developing countries to those belonging to the European Community can
probably be explained by the existence in the latter of a social protection and
other social benefits which do not exist to such an extent in the former. Simi-
larly, educational advantages of a country over another can drain a significant
fraction of the young citizens’ population from the latter to the former. As
stated by Tiebout (1956), individuals respond to regional discrepancies in the
economic environment by ”voting with their feet”.
Of course, the importance of the endowment in public facilities depends on
the size of fiscal pressure, since expenses entailed by the provision of public
goods have to be covered by the National Budget. The latter in turn is related
to the size of the population: the larger the population in the country, the
larger the tax base and the resulting product of taxes and, thus, the ability
of the government to make many public facilities available to the population.
Notice however that, beyond some level of use, public goods can also generate
negative externalities for their users. As club goods, the consumption of public
goods may suffer from congestion. When migration flows are not too excessive,
they are attractive for the residents who enjoy the positive externality resulting
from the increase in size in total population, and the resulting increase in the
provision of public facilities. But, beyond a certain level of population, including
migrants, the congestion cost resulting from migration may well overweigh the
positive externality created initially by the population size effect.
Interestingly enough, the above complex relationships generate subtle in-
teractions between the fiscal policies of different regions. Increasing the fiscal
pressure imposed to the residents in a given country increases its National Bud-
get and, thus, its potential endowment in public facilities. This in turn makes
the country more attractive to the citizens of the other country and, as long
as congestion effects do not take place, generate thereby migration movements
from the latter toward the former. As a result, the relative size of the popu-
lations in the two countries is modified. Thus, the fiscal policy adopted in a
region can serve to regulate migration toward that region, or vice versa. But the
same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the other region: the fiscal policy
adopted in the latter can create migration movements in the opposite direction.
Clearly, this opens the door to strategic interaction between the countries since
both of them share the power of influencing the size of migration flows between
them. In this paper we are precisely interested in studying the migration move-
ments resulting from these combined forces, in the framework of a stylized model
embodying two countries.
The basic ingredients of the model are as follows. There are two countries,
home H and foreign F, with country F being smaller in terms of its population.
Citizens can freely move from one country to the other. Residents are heteroge-
neous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident compares the
level of utility obtained at home with the utility obtained abroad. The first term
of this comparison writes as the sum of the utility derived from the consumption
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of home public goods and disutility resulting from home taxes levied on home
wages. The second term consists of the same magnitudes, but applied now to
foreign conditions: utility derived from the consumption of foreign public goods
and disutility resulting from foreign taxes levied on foreign wages. However,
this second term must also include the migration cost since the resident has
now to migrate abroad in order to benefit from the corresponding foreign con-
ditions. Individuals’ utility is assumed to be initially increasing in the amount
of public good. However, as club goods, the consumption of public goods suffers
from congestion. This means that, up to a certain extent of migration flows,
public goods are viewed as attractive. But, beyond a certain size of population,
including migrants, congestion costs start to overweigh the positive effects of
migration, which affects negatively the utility of the citizens. Countries set si-
multaneously the amount of public goods, which is assumed to be proportional
to population size, or to the product of taxes, to the extent that public goods
are assumed to be produced with a linear technology (constant returns to scale).
With this respect, the size of the constant returns parameter, called hereafter
the public good multiplier, is an important ingredient of the model since it de-
termines the rate at which the product of taxes is transformed into an amount
of public good. Countries are assumed to play a two stage game. In the first
stage, each government is assumed to set its tax rate. It is supposed to maxi-
mize tax revenue, taking into consideration the possible migration flow initiated
as a consequence of its fiscal pressure. In the second stage, residents in each
country decide whether to stay in their own country or to migrate.
The analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the above two stage game
leads to the following conclusions. First, a country can experience an inflow of
migrants if and only if the size of its population is strictly smaller than the size
of the population in the rival country. Furthermore, the larger its initial size,
the larger the inflow. Furthermore, this country sets a higher or lower tax rate
than its rival whenever the public good multiplier exceeds or not some threshold
value.
Another outcome of this analysis follows from the comparison of the coun-
tries’ sizes resulting from migration in the above game, with the size which
would be optimal from the viewpoint of the citizens in their country, given
the size existing before the migration had taken place. When the initial size
of the country is very small, migration entails that its population suffers from
congestion. Accordingly one must expect that the optimal desired size of the
country would be smaller than at equilibrium. This is indeed the case because
the Government ignores this fact when maximizing tax revenue against the ri-
val country. For intermediate sizes, the welfare optimal size can be larger or
smaller than the one achieved at the subgame perfect equilibrium, according to
the relative magnitude of the public good multiplier.
Our paper creates a bridge between two strands of literature. On the one
hand, our paper shares with previous papers (see for instance, Brueckner, 2000,
Burbidge and Myers, 1994, or Wilson, 1997), the idea that migrating people
can create congestion in the use of local public goods. However, our focus is not
only on the effect of migration on the population of the destination country. In
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fact, due to the strategic interaction between the two countries in their attempt
to attract mobile factors of production, the present paper also shares some
features with the large body of literature devoted to tax competition among
jurisdictions of asymmetric size, like in Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991, Kanbur
and Keen, 1993, and Trandel, 1994. We take a tax competition perspective
to analyze migration, and we introduce the level of public good as a strategic
choice for attractiveness of the country as done for capital attractiveness in
Thisse and Ypersele, 2002, or Zissimos and Wooders, 2008. Thus, differently
from Brueckner, 2000, Burbidge and Myers, 1994, or Wilson, 1997, we highlight
the role played by the size of the countries on defining their strategies of tax
and public goods levels and, thus, ultimately on defining migration flows.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general setup of the
model with two countries. Section 3 represents the same model with specific
ingredients of utility function including private-public consumption. Section
4 analyzes migration when it takes place from home to foreign country, while
Section 5 analyzes migration when it proceeds in the opposite direction. The
analysis in Sections 4 and 5 are performed assuming the tax competition of
Leviathan government which reshapes population. In Section 6, we examine
what is the desirable size of the population in the receiving country from a
welfare perspective. We end up with a short conclusion.
2 The general setup
Consider two countries, H and F , of uneven population size, whose governments
impose taxes on residents and supply each a public good. The population in
each country is distributed over types and the set of types in each country is
represented by the [0, 1] interval with different densities: λh in H and λf in F,
λh 6= λf . The heterogeneity of population is due to the individual level of home
attachment. As a consequence, a citizen of country i located at position x, faces
a migration cost x moving to country j. Clearly, similarly to the population, this
cost is uniformly distributed over the support interval [0, 1] . Types are ranked
by increasing order of disutility incurred from migration.
Consider a timeline of two periods. In the first period, people belong to a
origin country. In the second period, people may decide to migrate1.
Let us normalize the world population to 1. Then, country’s H population
λh in the first period is given by [0, λ0] where the subscript 0 indicates the
time period. Then the population λF of country F is simply (λ0, 1] . Given tax
rates th, tf , the individual of type x from country H obtains a utility level uh
if he/she decides to stay equal to uh = u(th, λh),where this utility function is
twice differentiable and combines private and public consumption. Moreover
1This assumption marks a difference of our paper with that of Tiebout (1956).While we
assume an initial exogenous allocation of people in countries, and study how this allocation
changes via migration flows, Tiebout (1956) does not assume the existence of an initial allo-
cation of people among the regions, but studies how people, which are initially not identified
to belong to a region, decide to allocate among them.
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∂u(th,λh)
∂th
< 0 while ∂u(th,λh)∂λh can assume any sign depending on the level of λh.
If ∂u(th,λh)∂λh > 0, then the congestion effect of migrants in the consumption of
public goods is dominated by the positive effect of higher tax revenue brought by
migrants. When instead ∂u(th,λh)∂λh < 0, the reverse holds true. If he/she decides
to migrate, this utility level (denote it by Uh) obtains as Uh = u(tf , λf ) − x,
with ∂u(tf ,λf )∂tf < 0,
∂u(tf ,λf )
∂λf
≶ 0. It follows that a strictly positive migration
flow takes place from country H to country F if, and only if, the set of types
{y/y ≤ x} where x solves the equation uh = Uh, i.e.
x = u(tf , λf )− u(th, λh) (1)
has strictly positive measure. Population of countries in the second period,
denoted by λ1h and λ
1
f , after a migration from country H to country F has
taken place, are given by
λ1f = λf + xλh (2)
λ1h = (1− x)λh (3)
When the governments take into account the future redistribution in the pop-
ulation resulting from the use of their tax strategies, it gives rise to a tax
game between the two countries, with tax rates strategies th and tf , and pay-
offs corresponding to the income tax revenues of the governments resulting
from the reshuffling in the population which follows from the use of these
tax rates. Assuming tax revenue maximizing governments, governments de-
cide non/cooperatively the taxes (th, tf ). Their choice is obtained by solving
the following problem
max
th
Πh(th, tf ) = (1− (u(tf , λf )− u(th, λh)))λhth (4)
max
tf
Πf (th, tf ) = (λf + (u(tf , λf )− u(th, λh))λh )tf ,
s.t.x, th, tf > 0. (5)
The first order conditions write as:
∂Πh(th, tf )
∂th
= λh − λh
[
u(tf , λf )− u(th,λh)− th ∂u(th,λh)
∂th
]
= 0 (6)
∂Πf (th, tf )
∂tf
= λf + λh
[
tf
∂u(tf,λf )
∂tf
+ u(tf ;λf )− u(th,λh)
]
= 0
To ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium and an interior solution of equilibrium
tax rates, we shall impose the following second order conditions
∂2Πh(th, tf )
∂th
< 0 and
∂2Πf (th, tf )
∂tf
< 0
which boil down to
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2
∂u(ti,λi)
∂ti
+ ti
∂2u(ti,λi)
∂ti
< 0, i = h, f.
Note that when the utility function is linear with respect to the amount of
taxes,∂
2u(ti,λi)
∂ti
= 0, the condition for an interior solution is simply
∂u(ti,λi)
∂ti
< 0.
The solution of the system of (6) reveals the equilibrium taxes :
t∗h(λh, λf ) =
(uh(λh)− uf (λf ))λh − λf
λh
∂u(tf,λf )
∂tf
t∗f (λh, λf ) =
uf (λf )− uh(λh)− 1
λh
∂u(th,λh)
∂th
and the corresponding equilibrium migration flow as :
x∗(t∗h, t
∗
f ) = u(t
∗
f , λf )− u(t∗h, λh)
whenever 0 < x∗(t∗h, t
∗
f ) < 1 and equilibrium taxes are nonnegative and interior
to the admissible interval [0, 1].
3 The model
In this section, we proceed by describing the more specific model used in order
to get a closed form, and to understand better the mechanics underlying the
process of migration. There are two goods in the economy, produced with labor
as unique input. Each citizen is endowed with one unit of labor serving as input
for the production of both the public and the private good. The government
owns a linear technology, used for the production of the public good, Φ(z) = kz,
k < 1, with z denoting the amount of input which we assume to be equal to the
amount of labor made available to the government. As for the production of
the private good, citizens have access to a technology Ψ which transforms one
unit of labor into one unit of the private good, i.e Ψ(z) = z. The labor used by
the government in the production of the public good is obtained by diverting
some fraction ti, i = H,F, from each individual’s labor endowment, which we
called hereafter the tax imposed in country i. The government pays each worker
in units of the private good, at its marginal product, namely, kt.The private
good is also produced by each individual using the fraction 1 − ti of labor
remaining available after taxation. Accordingly, at the end of the production
process, each individual in country i is endowed with a bundle of goods equal to
(kti+(1−ti), kλiti) where the first component corresponds to the amount of the
private good, received from the government as a salary and the one individually
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produced, and the second to the amount of the public good produced and made
available by the government.
Moreover, we assume that, corresponding to this bundle, each citizen re-
ceives a utility level equal to
kti + (1− ti) +
[
k(1− λi)ti − (1− λi)2
]
: (7)
the two first terms of this expression refer to the utility obtained from con-
suming the private good while the term k(1−λi)ti− (1− λi)2 measures his/her
utility when consuming the public good produced in country i, (kλiti). Thus,
we assume that utility is linearly decreasing in the amount of taxes and additive
between the utility of the private good and the utility of the public good. Fur-
thermore, while the utility is always increasing with the size of the population
λi when kti is larger than 2, while it may well decrease in the opposite case.
This is due to the term λ2i which represents a negative externality arising from
congestion when the public good is rivalrous. In the case of two countries, resi-
dents may initially benefit from additional migrants because of their additional
contribution to the amount of public good produced, but migration can also
bring congestion costs when the public good is rivalrous.
Finally, in this specification of the general model, our analysis is restricted to
a level of size asymmetry between the two countries guaranteeing the positivity
of taxes at equilibrium, namely, we assume that λ0 < 14 . The reason of this
restriction is that, when, countries are too much alike (so that λ0 is close to 12 ),
the congestion in the use of the public good due to population movements is
very similar in the two countries. Therefore, the main rationale for migration is
based on tax purposes, making tax competition so harsh that taxes are driven
down to zero. Assuming a sufficient asymmetry makes that congestion matters
in the migration process, thus allowing us to study the variety of policy mixes of
governments when countries are really different in terms of populations’ size2.
In order to identify the Nash equilibria of this tax game according to the
level of the public good multiplier k, we need to assume ex-ante their existence
according to three possible cases: when there is a strictly positive migration
from the large country to the small one, a strictly positive migration from the
small country to the large one, and no migration. We start with the first case.
4 Migration from H to F
Given tax rates th, tf , and total income, the individual of type x from country
H obtains a utility level Uh if he/she decides to stay equal to (7) while, if he/she
decides to migrate, her utility is U
′
h = ktf + (1 − tf ) +
[
kλ0tf − λ20
] − x . It
follows that a strictly positive migration flow takes place from country H to
country F if, and only if, the set of types {y/y ≤ x} where x solves the equation
U ′h = Uh, i.e.
2The model is easily solved in absence of such an assumption.
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x = max {(th − tf + kλ0 (tf + th) + k (tf − 2th) + 1− 2λ0) ; 0} (8)
has positive measure. To examine when this condition is satisfied, let us evaluate
the sign of x at a Nash equilibrium, assuming initially its existence. The size
of the migration flow depends on the difference between taxes and on the size
asymmetry of populations, which affects the utility from consuming the public
good. Population in country F next period, when a migration from country H
to country F has taken place, is given by
λ1(λ0) = λ0 + x(1− λ0). (9)
Substituting x, as in (8), in (9), we get
λ1(λ0) = λ0 + (1− λ0) (th − tf + kλ0 (tf + th) + k (tf − 2th) + 1− 2λ0) . (10)
Now consider the tax game between countries H and F, with strategies th and tf ,
and payoffs Πh(th, tf ) = (1−λ1(λ0))th and Πf (th, tf ) = λ1(λ0)tf for countriesH
and F , respectively. We assume that each government maximizes its payoff given
the tax strategy of its opponent, taking into account the future redistribution in
the population resulting from the use of the tax strategies. To identify a Nash
equilibrium of this game (if it exists), we must solve the maximization problem
:
max
th
Πh(th, tf ) = (1− λ1(λ0))th (11)
max
tf
Πf (th, tf ) = λ1(λ0)tf ,
s.t.mh,mf , x, th, tf > 0. (12)
In the coming propositions and in Appendix 2, we show that there exist
two types of equilibria in which people migrate from H to F . Such equilibria
are unique and correspond to two separated intervals of values for the public
good multiplier k. In the first type equilibrium, the level of k is relatively low,
namely, 0 < k < 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 , and the net income to citizens after taxation
is positive. While in the other type of equilibrium, the level of k lies in the
interval 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 < k <
1
2−λ0 and in the home country the net of income to
citizens after taxation is equal to zero, while in the foreign country it remains
strictly positive. We proceed in detail here for the analysis of the first type of
equilibrium, and send the analysis of the other type in Appendix 2.
Substituting (10) into (11), we get the equilibrium of the tax game, whenever
it exists. Second order conditions for an interior maximum require that k < 11+λ0
and k < 12−λ0 . Notice that, due to the assumption λ0 <
1
4 , k <
1
2−λ0 hence
k < 11+λ0 . In this range of values of k, solving (11), we easily obtain the tax
rates t∗h and t
∗
f , respectively, which are given by:
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t∗h =
(
2λ20 − 2λ0 − 1
)
3 (kλ0 − 2k + 1) (λ0 − 1) , (13)
t∗f =
2
(
λ20 − λ0 + 1
)
3 (k + kλ0 − 1) (λ0 − 1) .
The resulting equilibrium flow of migrants from H to F obtains as:
0 < x∗ =
(λ0 − 2) (2λ0 − 1)
3 (1− λ0) < 1
It is easy to check that 0 < x∗ < 1 for any admissible λ0.3 In Appendix 1, we
show the conditions under which the income levels at equilibrium are positive.
The resulting population λ∗1 at equilibrium in the foreign country is thus equal
to λ∗1 = λ0 + x
∗(1− λ0).
Hence,
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the tax game where
the smaller country experiences a strictly positive inflow of migrants if and only
if the public good multiplier is relatively low.
Proof. In this range of k both maximization problems given by (11) are concave.
The above proposition identifies a threshold on k under which the equilib-
rium migration flow takes place from the large country to the small one because
the level of the public good multiplier is low and, consequently, the congestion
in using the public good in the large country is higher than the congestion in
the small one. Does it imply that the small country is able to tax more than
the large country because people escape congestion? To answer this question
we compare the level of equilibrium taxes (13) :
Proposition 2 The smaller country sets a strictly higher (resp. lower) tax
than its rival whenever the public good multiplier k satisfies the inequality 0 <
k < 1−2λ03(1−λ0) (resp.
1−2λ0
3(1−λ0) < k <
2λ20−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 ).
Proof. Comparing t∗h and t
∗
f ,we observe that t
∗
h > t
∗
f iff
1−2λ0
3(1−λ0) < k. Note that
1−2λ0
3(1−λ0) <
1−λ0−2λ20
2λ0−5λ20+1 .Consequently, in the constellation of parameters where a
unique Nash equilibrium of the tax game exists, namely 0 < k < 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 ,
the tax levied by the smaller country can be smaller but also higher than the
tax levied by the larger country. Q.E.D.
31 > x∗ ⇔ 1− (λ0−2)(2λ0−1)
3(1−λ0) =
1
3
−2λ0+2λ20−1
λ0−1 > 0 Q.E.D.
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Thus, the answer to the above question is positive: in some range of k values
the small country imposes higher taxes than the large country taking advantage
from the fact that people escape from congestion in H.
The above proposition describes two scenarios, where a migration flow takes
place from H to F , but the driving forces of the flow are different. When the
public good multiplier is quite small, the likeliness of high congestion is high.
Indeed, for this range of k, citizens quit the large country H, because they
avoid the congestion in using the public good. This is true no matter the tax
advantage supplied in the small country. But when the public good multiplier
increases, the congestion and the public good effect start to offset each other.
Thus, the small country can be attractive for tax reasons. Consequently, citizens
quit H to take advantage of low taxes in F . This result marks a difference of our
paper with the tax competition literature as Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991),
Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Trandel (1994), who find that small countries are
systematically undercutting taxes in order to attract capital or mobile labor.
In these papers, congestion is absent and, therefore, the capital flight or labor
movements are only due to tax differences.
In Appendix 2, it is shown that outside the range mentioned above, namely
2λ20−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 < k <
1
2−λ0 , the smaller country experiences a strictly positive
inflow of migrants and sets a strictly lower tax at equilibrium (interior solution)
than its rival (corner solution). Intuition of that statement is a continuation of
proposition 1, as equilibrium taxes given above are increasing functions of k:
higher levels of the public good multiplier give the possibility for the countries
to tax more. Especially the bigger country benefits from a higher provision of
the public good, so that its equilibrium tax reaches the upper bound faster, at
which net income starts to become not negative.
5 Migration from F to H
In this section, we start from the assumption that there exists a positive flow
from F to H with the equilibrium taxes, when k ≥ 1/(2−λ0). After proving the
uniqueness of the equilibrium in the unique range k < 1/(2− λ0), naturally we
can state that the analysis, when applied to the range k ≥ 1/(2−λ0), will identify
the equilibria when a migration takes place from F to H or when no migration
takes place. Similarly to the above section, given taxes th, tf , the individual of
type x from country F obtains a utility level Uf = tf (k− 1) + 1 + λ0(ktf − λ0)
if he/she decides to stay while, if he/she decides to migrate, this utility level
(denote it by U ′f ) obtains as U
′
f = th(k − 1) + 1− x+ (kth − 1 + λ0)(1− λ0)
It follows that a strictly positive migration flow takes place from country
F to country H if, and only if, the set of types {y/y ≤ x} where x solves the
equation Uf = U ′f , i.e.
x = max {(tf − th + 2λ0 − ktf + 2kth − ktfλ0 − kthλ0 − 1) ; 0} .
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The size of the migration flow depends again on the difference in taxes and on the
size asymmetry of the populations. Similarly to the above section, governments‘
maximization problems are
max
th
Πh(th, tf ) = (1− λ1(λ0))th (14)
max
tf
Πf (th, tf ) = λ1(λ0)tf (15)
s.t.mh,mf , x, th, tf ≥ 0.
Notice that the problem faced by the government in country F is strictly concave
in the set k < 11+λ0 . Therefore, in this set, we can use the FOC to identify its
best reply. The problem faced by the government of country H is convex when
k > 12−λ0 . Therefore, the tax in this country reaches its maximum at the level
of tax at which net income is still non negative. Similarly to the above section
we develop the full analysis of the types of equilibria in Appendix 3. As above,
there exist two types of equilibrium taxes corresponding to different levels of k.
Here, we develop the scenario where at least one of the equilibrium taxes is an
interior solution. The constellation of parameters where this equilibrium arises
is 1−2λ02−5λ0 < k <
1
1+λ0
. We call the levels of k belonging to this interval the
relatively high public good multiplier’s values. In this scenario, solving (14), we
easily obtain the candidates equilibrium taxes t∗h and t
∗
f , given by
t∗h =
1
1− k (16)
t∗f =
3kλ0 + 3− 4k − 2λ0
2 (k + kλ0 − 1) (k − 1) .
The resulting equilibrium flow of migrants from H to F obtains as:
x∗ =
3kλ0 − 2λ0 − 2k + 1
2k − 2 > 0.
The resulting population λ∗1 at equilibrium in the foreign country is thus equal
to λ∗1 = λ0 (1− x∗) .
In Appendix 3, we show that the level of incomes are non negative at equi-
librium. Hence,
Proposition 3 When the public good multiplier is relatively high, the bigger
country experiences a strictly positive inflow of migrants and sets a strictly
higher tax (corner solution) than its rival (interior solution).
Proof. Provided the initial assumption of this section i.e. k ≥ 12−λ0 , second
order condition for the home country‘s maximization problems violates and for
the foreign one it requires k < 11+λ0 to be satisfied.
The driving force for the migration flow from F to H is the public good
effect: When k is large, the positive effect of the consumption of the public
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good dominates both the tax and the congestion effects. Therefore, consumers
quit F and leave towards the large country H to consume the public good.
When the public good multiplier is relatively high and therefore positive
externalities from tax collection is high, both countries try not only to keep
their residents, but also to attract immigrants. In this case, the small country is
disadvantaged, but it tries however to keep its residents by setting lower taxes.
From the above analyses, it follows that migration flows are driven by three
major forces: the level of public good, the level of taxes and the congestion level.
For a high provision of public facilities, the benefit obtained from the public good
consumption overweighs the disutility from congestion and high taxes. Due to
its larger amount of public goods, the larger country has the power to attract
migrants even though it taxes more than the smaller country: the benefit from
public goods’ overweighs the disutility from congestion and higher tax. When
the provision of public good consumption is moderate, the small country has
advantage attracting migrants by levying lower taxes. Finally, when the level
of public good consumption is sufficiently low, the congestion effect dominates
the benefits obtained from public good consumption and even lower taxes, so
that the small country now becomes the destination place for migrants coming
from the larger country.
To conclude, it is interesting to notice that in a different framework, Hindriks
et al. (2008) find that the small country can win the competition for mobile
capital by supplying a more appealing environment for capital through public
investments rather than only be competitive in terms of capital taxation.
6 Optimal size of countries
When the size of populations is driven by competition between Leviathan gov-
ernments, the resulting countries’ size can be far from being optimal from the
perspectives of the hosting population’s welfare.
When considering the equilibrium size of countries, we observe the trade-off
between benefits and costs from a larger size. The cost per capita of many
public goods is lower in larger countries, as more taxpayers pay for them, and
the benefit of the larger country increases up to the point of congestion. Alesina
and Spolaore (1997) have calculated the optimal number and size of countries
with various states of the governments. Here we do not have such an ambition.
We simply intend to find the optimal relative distribution of populations. To
do so, define λd1 the population level which would maximize the welfare of the
foreign country, given the equilibrium taxes we have identified above. We are
led to compare λd1 with the population λ
∗
1 resulting from the equilibrium taxes.
We want to see whether the population level corresponding to the choice of the
governments coincides or departs from the population level in the country that
maximizes the utility of the representative resident.
The utility obtained by the representative individual living in country F
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obtains as :
UF = 1− tf + (ktf − λ1)λ1
which has to be maximized with respect to the size λ1.Solving the first order
condition, we get the optimal welfare size λd1 for the foreign country, namely
λd1 =
1
2
kt∗f (k).
For tractability, we demonstrate how the equilibrium size is different from the
optimal welfare size of the foreign country within two intervals of the public
good multiplier’s values when taxes are kept at their corresponding equilibrium
values.
Proposition 4 When the migration flow takes place from H to F , then λ∗1 ≥
λd1. By contrast, when the migration flow takes place from F to H, then λ
∗
1 < λ
d
0
if k < 3−2λ04−3λ0 , otherwise λ
∗
1 > λ
d
0.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
When migration flow takes place from H to F , residents of the small country
suffer immigration flows due to congestion. But the government ignores this fact
when it maximizes tax revenue rather than the welfare of its natives.
When migration flow takes place from F to H, two scenarios are possible:
(i) When k < 3−2λ04−3λ0 , the population of the small country prefers a smaller
outflow than the government does in order to avoid the decrease in its population
which would entail a reduction in the amount of public good available. But,
due to tax competition, the government in country F is challenged by the larger
rival country.
(ii) When k > 3−2λ04−3λ0 , the population in country F would desire a smaller
size than the one reached under tax competition because the higher k the higher
tax rates in the tax competition setup. While, according to the desired level of
population by people, the increase of k leads to a decrease of tax rates. Due to
this lower level of tax rates people prefer a lower level of population than the
government does.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the relationship between local public good consumption
and migratory flows. Assuming that the local public good level is attractive for
foreign citizens and not only for the native population in a country, we show how
the differences of the public good level provided in different countries determine
the direction and size of migration flows among them. We use a two-country
model, where the decision of residents of the large or the small country about
where to locate, is the result of the trade off between public good and private
good consumption net of taxes and the cost of moving abroad. Countries provide
a public good with congestion and set income taxes in order to maximize tax
revenue.
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The main results of the paper sort out three major scenarios: (i) the large
country experiences immigration by supplying a high level of public good even
though taxes are higher than the small country. This is the advantage of be-
ing large; (ii) the small country experiences immigration because it offers low
income taxes supplying a moderate level of public good. And, finally, (iii) the
small country experiences immigration supplying a low level of public good and
taxing more than the large country. In this case, migrants escape congestion
in public good consumption in the large country. This is the benefit of being
small.
High levels of public good provision may guarantee strong positive networks
externalities and have cumulative effects. Moreover, the large country taking
advantage of its size can afford high taxes in order to increase tax revenue
needed for the provision of public goods. This is the process of agglomeration,
as defined in the economic geography literature (see Fujita and Thisse, 2002).
While, small countries can attract migrants (or keep home their residents) by
fixing small taxes. Empirically, it is proved that migrants do react on tax
differences when choosing their location (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2005).
The scenario we want to emphasize is the case where the congestion effect
defines the direction of migrants (scenario (iii)). In this case, the small coun-
try is neither attractive for public facilities nor for small taxes, but it takes
advantage from the level of congestion in public goods into the large country.
These dynamics correspond to a small value of the public good multiplier. For
instance, the public good multiplier can be small due to an inefficient manage-
ment of public money, which translate into low level of public services and high
congestion in the large country.
Interestingly enough, a parallelism can be made between our paper and
the analysis of network goods with congestion. For example, consider the case
of a mobile operator company. While there are clear benefits from having a
large network of consumers, it may damage the quality of the service due to
congestion. Some consumers might end up preferring a smaller network mobile
operator even paying more, because they read the signal of high price and small
network as a signal of higher quality service, image and luxury.
Finally, we want to point out that our theoretical study does not account for
alternative reasons of migration, cultural differences, diaspora effects or family
ties 4. It would be a natural further step to this paper to analyze the conse-
quences of such alternative causalities on migration flows. Another future path
of research would consist in discriminating among public goods with the aim of
identifying which type of public good attracts which type of migrants. For ex-
ample, it is believed that high skilled (educated) individuals have lower mobility
costs and tend to locate in countries where there is a good education system
and a significant cultural environment. This study would allow a more refined
analysis of migrants’ motivations and the impact of governments’ policies on
4Some of these factors have still to find an empirical support. For instance, the effects of
wage differences on migration are found not significant in Borjas (2000). While, we do find
some empirical evidence on the role of public good level on migration ( see Passel and Clark
(1994).)
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migration flows.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
This appendix refers to the Section 4, where we show the nonnegativiness of
equilibrium income levels when k is satisfies the following range
0 < k <
−(5λ0−2λ20−2)
(5λ20−11λ0+5)
and equilibrium taxes are give by (13), equilibrium m∗h
writes as:
m∗h =
1
3
(
5λ20 − 11λ0 + 5
)
k +
(
5λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
(λ0 − 1) (−2k + kλ0 + 1)
From the SOC recall that, kλ0 − 2k + 1 > 0, so m∗h > 0 if(
5λ20 − 11λ0 + 5
)
k +
(
5λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
< 0. The latter condition writes as:
k <
2λ20 − 5λ0 + 2
5λ20 − 11λ0 + 5
(17)
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Equilibrium m∗f becomes:
m∗f =
(
5λ20 − 2λ0 − 1
)
k +
(
1− λ0 − 2λ20
)
3 (k + kλ0 − 1) (λ0 − 1)
From the SOC recall that, k + kλ0 − 1 < 0 , so
m∗h > 0 if
(
5λ20 − 2λ0 − 1
)
k +
(
1− λ0 − 2λ20
)
> 0. The latter condition writes
as:
k <
1− λ0 − 2λ20
2λ0 − 5λ20 + 1
(18)
Notice that 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 ≤
1−λ0−2λ20
2λ0−5λ20+1 , which means that the condition (7) guar-
antees non negativeness of net taxed incomes in the both country. Q.E.D
Appendix 2
This appendix proves the statement in Section 4 on existence of a strictly posi-
tive inflow of migrants in the smaller country in the following range of the public
good multiplier 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 < k <
1
2−λ0 .
In this range of k, both maximization problems given by (11) are concave,
as we have seen from the proof of Proposition 1, when k < 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 violates,
mh becomes negative, in this case th solves the condition for non negativeness
of the net income (maximum possible tax at which the income is not negative).
t∗h =
1
1− k
Provided that k < 1, then t∗h is strictly positive.
The reaction function for the equilibrium tax rate of th foreign country is:
tf =
2λ0 − th − 2λ20 + 2kth + λ0th − 3kλ0th + kλ20th − 1
2 (1− λ0) (k + kλ0 − 1)
The candidate equilibrium tax is:
t∗f =
1
2
(
3λ20 − 5λ0 + 3
)
k +
(
3λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
(λ0 − 1) (k + kλ0 − 1) (k − 1)
Recall from the SOC that, k + kλ0 − 1 < 0, so t∗f > 0 iff(
3λ20 − 5λ0 + 3
)
k +
(
3λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
. Here we use the constraint condition
k < 12−λ0 , which gives us:(
3λ20 − 5λ0 + 3
)
k+
(
3λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
<
(
3λ20 − 5λ0 + 3
)
1
2−λ0 +
(
3λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
=
= (λ0 − 1) 2λ0−2λ
2
0−1
λ0−2 < 0.Q.E.D
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Nonnegativity of income: We plug the tax rate calculated above in the
income function of the foreign country, and we get:
m∗f =
1
2
(
5λ20 − 5λ0 + 1
)
k +
(
λ0 − 2λ20
)
(λ0 − 1) (k + kλ0 − 1) (19)
where mf > 0 iff
(
5λ20 − 5λ0 + 1
)
k +
(
λ0 − 2λ20
)
> 0. This is always true as
λ0 <
1
4 .Q.E.D
After checking the positiveness of the equilibrium net incomes, we check the
validity of an initial assumption on positivity of the equilibrium flow:
x∗ =
1
2
(
3λ20 − 7λ0 + 3
)
k +
(
5λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
(1− λ0) (k − 1) (20)
where x∗ > 0 iff
(
3λ20 − 7λ0 + 3
)
k+
(
5λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
< 0. Recall that k < 12−λ0
and λ0 < 14 , so we write:(
3λ20 − 7λ0 + 3
)
k +
(
5λ0 − 2λ20 − 2
)
< (λ0 − 1) 4λ0−2λ
2
0−1
λ0−2 < 0. Q.E.D
Note that migration is not full, which means that x∗is less than 1 for any
feasible value of k :
1− x∗ = 1− 12
(3λ20−7λ0+3)k+(5λ0−2λ20−2)
(1−λ0)(k−1) =
1
2
(3λ20−5λ0+1)k+(3λ0−2λ20)
(λ0−1)(k−1) > 0.Q.E.D
Appendix 3
This appendix refers to Section 5, where we show the nonnegativiness of equilib-
rium net income levels when k is satisfies the following range 1−2λ02−5λ0 < k <
1
1+λ0
and equilibrium taxes are give by 16, equilibrium m∗f writes as:
m∗f =
1
2
(5λ0 − 2) k + (1− 2λ0)
k + kλ0 − 1
Recall that k + kλ0 − 1 < 0, so m∗f is positive iff (5λ0 − 2) k + (1− 2λ0) < 0
which writes as:
1− 2λ0
2− 5λ0 < k
If 1−2λ02−5λ0 < k <
1
1+λ0
violates, we have a corner solution for the pair of taxes:
(i) If (1−2λ0)−(5λ0−2) < k violates, then candidate m
∗
f given above becomes negative.
Hence, taxes reach their maximum value, which solves nonnegativeness of the
net income; (ii) If k < 1λ0+1 violates, then maximization problem for the foreign
country becomes convex and the equilibrium tax rates are upper bounded with
the same constraint as in the previous case:
t∗h = t
∗
f =
1
1− k (21)
The resulting equilibrium flow of migrants from F to H obtains as:
x∗ = (2λ0 − 1) 2k − 1
k − 1 > 0
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Recall that: 12 <
1
2−λ0 < k < 1 , which guarantees x to be positive. Note
that 1 > x∗ if 1 − x∗ = k(4λ0−3)−2λ0+21−k > 0. The latter inequality satisfies iff
k (4λ0 − 3) + 2 − 2λ0 > 0. So, k < 2−2λ03−4λ0 , guarantees the survival of the small
country, otherwise when k reaches its highest range, H country gains attrac-
tiveness being big and augmenting public good by higher k, so full migration is
expected.
Appendix 4
We consider the desirable size of the F country from the perspectives of resident
population, when taxes are given by (13):
∂
∂λ0
Uf =
∂
∂λ0
(tf (k − 1) + 1 + (ktf − λ0)λ0) = ktf − 2λ0 = 0
The solution is given by:
λd0 =
ktf
2
We selected two intervals for k to demonstrate the difference between equilib-
rium and desired size of the foreign country.
1. First, we consider the scenario, where the migration takes from place from
H to F, this scenario belongs to the range k < 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 . Hence, the optimal
λd0 when taxes are given by (13) is:
λd0 =
(
λ20 − λ0 + 1
)
k
3 (λ0 − 1) (k + kλ0 − 1)
The equilibrium size reached after the free movement of migrants with the same
equilibrium pairs of taxes writes as:
λ∗1 =
2
(
λ20 − λ0 + 1
)
3
We compare equilibrium and optimal sizes of the country F : λ∗1 > λ
d
0 if λ
∗
1−λd0 =
1
3
(
λ20 − λ0 + 1
) (2λ20−3)k+(2−2λ0)
(λ0−1)(k+kλ0−1) > 0 and this is true if
(
2λ20 − 3
)
k + (2− 2λ0)
is positive. Recall that k < 2λ
2
0−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5 , which gives us
(
2λ20 − 3
)
k+(2− 2λ0) >
2λ20−5λ0+2
5λ20−11λ0+5
(
2λ20 − 3
)
+ (2− 2λ0) > 0, Q.E.D
2. Secondly, we consider the scenario, where the migration takes place from
F to H, which belongs to the range 1−2λ02−5λ0 < k <
1
1+λ0
and in this range the
optimal λd0 when taxes are given by (16) is:
λd0 =
1
4
k
−4k − 2λ0 + 3kλ0 + 3
(k − 1) (k + kλ0 − 1)
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The equilibrium size reached after the free movement of migrants writes as:
λ∗1 =
(3kλ0 + 3− 4k − 2λ0)λ0
2 (1− k)
We compare equilibrium and desired sizes of the country F :
λ∗1 > λ
d
0 if λ
∗
1 − λd0 = 14 (4k + 2λ0 − 3kλ0 − 3) k−2λ0+2kλ0+2kλ
2
0
(k−1)(k+kλ0−1) > 0, this is true
if 4k+ 2λ0− 3kλ0− 3 = (4− 3λ0) k+ (2λ0 − 3) > 0 which writes as k > 3−2λ04−3λ0 .
Consequently: λ∗1 < λ
d
0 if k <
3−2λ0
4−3λ0 . Q.E.D.
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